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Latin America in the 
Global Crisis
PAUL SINGER
Origins and Consequensces of the Global Crisis 
AS EVERYONE knows, the global crisis originated with the burst of the real estate bubble in the United States. The bubble was provoked by the competitive supply of credit to an increasing number of 
housing buyers, generating a continuous rise in demand for real estate, the 
prices for which grew nonstop for fi ve years. The rise in prices re-fueled the 
bubble causing it to affect the entire economy. The new owners used the 
increased value of their assets, which served as a guarantee, to take on more 
loans, originating additional spending that transferred the high prices to 
other economic sectors. The increased demand for more consumption even 
reached imported products, causing the effects of the U.S. real estate bubble 
to spread throughout the world.  
  This spread was only possible because of the large infl uence of the 
United States in the world economy and the extent of commercial and fi nancial 
globalization in recent years. The successive rounds of commercial liberalization 
culminated in the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
approval of treaties that in principle impose free trade on all nations. It is clear 
that the power of the WTO to enforce obedience to its resolutions is very 
unequal, being quite limited in relation to First World countries, which continue 
to protect and support their agriculture, but crushing in relation to smaller and 
poorer countries, which in general are very dependent on foreign commerce and 
foreign capital.  
 The commercial and fi nancial integration of the Third World to the 
U.S., European, and Japanese economies resulted in a clear strengthening of the 
capitalist class in relation to the proletariat within these countries, because free 
trade and the free circulation of capital between the national economies allows 
transnational companies to shift their companies to countries in which the cost 
of labor is lower, leaving behind sad pockets of poverty and unemployment and 
a weakened labor movement, incapable of integrally defending its economic, 
social and political conquests. This change in relation of forces between classes 
was felt in all the industrialized countries and also expressed in the sharpening of 
inequality between the large transnationals and smaller companies, which operate 
only in domestic markets.  
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 The exception noted by all was a small number of semi-developed 
countries with large populations and territories, which have absorbed most of the 
economic activity that shifted from the First World and have been able to take 
advantage of the bubbles produced by the fi nancial deregulation to grow rapidly 
for a number of decades. Among the emerging countries, four stand out and are 
known as the BRIC – Brazil, Russia, India and China – with the latter becoming 
the world’s third largest economy. In each continent, a number of not so large 
countries were able to take advantage of the U.S. bubble such as South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, etc. in Asia, and here in Latin America, Argentina, 
Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Panama and Costa Rica. 
 The same has taken place in Europe and South Africa. It appears that 
globalization only punished the proletariat, both in the center and in the 
periphery. In practically all the countries (including Brazil), labor income 
was strongly concentrated in the hands of the directors of large companies, 
with earnings that with the eruption of the crisis have become the focus of 
fi nancial sector scandals. Commercial and fi nancial globalization have certainly 
concentrated wealth and power in the classes that already enjoyed them and in 
the countries that encompassed large global fi nancial markets, highlighted by 
New York and London. In addition, it removed from the Nation States (with 
the exception of those mentioned here) the power to regulate the commercial 
and fi nancial relations of their own citizens with the rest of the world. The states 
had established these powers during the crisis of the 1930s and World War II 
and used them to recover from historic delays and establish the bases of  Social 
Welfare States. Since 1979, the reactionary wave of neoliberalism caused a return 
to the hegemony of private capital, typical of the 19th century. 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the Global Crisis 
 The crisis struck Latin America by means of changes in external economic 
conditions, such as the fl ight of strong currencies to the First World, extinction 
of external credit and sharp reductions of exports, direct foreign investments and 
transfers from emigrants to the First World. In the case of Brazil, although the 
private domestic banks did not suffer losses with the U.S. mortgage crisis, they 
succumbed to the panic and contracted the credit supply, punishing the smaller 
banks, which are dependent on funding from the large banks, which receive most 
of the deposits from companies and families. The small banks fi nance micro and 
small companies, which employ a large part of the economically active population. 
The contraction of their activity (which also did not spare the solidarity economy) 
provoked a considerable reduction  of production in this segment. Large industry, 
in turn, was hit both by the drop in exports as well as by the decreased credit to 
buyers of automobiles, large appliances and other high value goods. 
 The crisis deepened when industry conducted widespread layoffs. The 
fl ood of bad economic news, nationally and internationally, stridently presented 
by the media, spread the panic among business and consumers. In the fourth 
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semester of 2008, Brazilian GNP fell 3.6% despite government efforts to quell 
the crisis and compensate the freeze in lending by the private banks with 
the provision of credit to producers and consumers from government banks. 
Investments in production dropped considerably, because of the lack of credit 
from private banks and the lack of business confi dence that government policy 
would be able to quickly resolve the crisis.
 The international crisis has been affecting Latin American countries 
in various ways due to the large differences between them. Medium and large 
countries and those that are quite industrialized and urbanized, such as Mexico, 
Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela and Chile, were hit by the crisis similarly 
to Brazil with capital fl ight, reduced exports and foreign credit and contaminated 
by panic among private domestic banks, which also cut credit and increased 
interest rates. This contracted domestic markets, causing a drop in production 
and increased unemployment. 
 The many small countries in the region, above all in the Caribbean, were 
affected more directly by the international  crisis because they depend much 
more on imported products, paid for by export income and the limited number 
of primary products and especially tourism and income sent back by emigrants to 
families still in their native country.  Costa Rica receives 19.5% of its GNP from 
fi rst world exports and Honduras 12.5%. Tourism accounts for 40% of the GNP 
of Santa Lucia, 30% of that in the Bahamas, 28% in Barbados, and 25% in St. 
Kitts & Nevis. For the Caribbean as a whole, tourism accounts for a fi fth of all 
economic activity. Since the crisis struck the real economy of the United States 
and Europe in mid 2008, tourists from these parts of the world grew sparse, in 
contrast with the cases of Brazil and others like it, which only felt the crisis in the 
fi nal quarter of 2008. 
 The reduction of transfers from emigrants, due to the crisis in the First 
World, had a similar effect. These transfers represent 40% of the economy of 
Guiana, 25% in Haiti, 20% in Jamaica, 14% in Guatemala and 9% in Bolivia. 
These are all considerably poor countries and the hardship of their fellow 
countrymen, who lost their jobs abroad, has had strong repercussions on these 
national economies. Another loss of  the small countries was the drop in Direct 
Foreign Investments on which depend many other countries in the region such 
as Antigua & Barbuda (where they account for 24.7% of economic activity) and 
Granada (21.8% of the economic activity). Although in absolute terms, the value 
of direct foreign investment that reaches the large countries is much greater, their 
weight in the GNP is incomparably lower: 1.6% in Argentina, 1.9% in Brazil, 2.4% 
in Chile, 2.5% in Mexico and 3.4% in Colombia (Cepal, 2008).
Government Measures to Combat the Global Crisis 
 The crisis of 2008 is qualitatively different from preceding crises, in 
both scope and depth.  Unlike the crises of the 80’s, 90’s and the fi rst years of 
this century,   which in general were limited to one part of the world or a few 
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countries, this crisis spread throughout the world, not sparing developed, semi-
developed or undeveloped countries. In addition, it has imposed great damage 
on the world’s large fi nancial conglomerates, some of which remain completely 
undercapitalized. As publicly held companies, their shares are subject to daily 
trading on stock exchanges, and since they suffered unthinkable damage 
because of the non-payment of subprime mortgages, their share prices fell to 
nearly zero. That of Citibank, which until recently had been the world’s largest 
bank, came to be traded at less than one dollar a share. 
 Under capitalized banks cannot make loans and suffer from a decrease 
in deposits, because it is their own capital that guarantees compliance with 
contracts with depositors and borrowers. Although technically still not 
bankrupt, they are open, but not functioning, considered “zombies.” With a 
large part of their portfolios constituted by “toxic” securities, or that is, those 
that offer no returns, their share prices cannot recover, to such a degree that the 
international fi nancial system became nearly paralyzed, affecting the operation 
of the real economy, which depends on fi nancing to be able to buy sell and 
invest. 
 All this explains why this time the fi ght against the crisis was not left 
to intergovernmental fi nancial regulatory agencies, such as the IMF and the 
World Bank, but mobilized all the national governments, which since the fi rst 
moment resolved to abandon any presumption that the fi nancial markets are 
self-regulating and sought to rescue their domestic banks, nearly at any cost.  
Since a large portion of these banks were directly responsible for the fi nancial 
extravagances  that created the real estate bubble, their pure and simple revival 
with taxpayers’ resources was rejected by public opinion and the media, 
which refl ects this public sentiment. When it became known that the banks in 
question were authors of  “fi nancial innovations” that hid the risks of securities 
sustained by real estate mortgages, in addition to disguising their balance sheets 
and offering their executives options to purchase shares at favorable prices, 
which provided billions in bonuses, there was deep and widespread  opposition 
from public opinion to the purchase of toxic securities with taxpayer money.
 To escape the impasse between trying to confront public opinion or 
prolong the fi nancial paralysis and the drop in production and employment 
in the real economy, one government after another began to nationalize the 
“living-dead” banks by purchasing part or all of their assets with Treasury 
funds. These nationalizations were faced by the most conservative governments 
as provisional measures, to be revoked as soon as the fi nancial crisis is overcome, 
and for this reason the administration of these banks remained in the hands of 
the same people who led them before the crisis. More progressive governments, 
in turn, substituted the administrations of the nationalized banks with people 
of confi dence, prepared to reactivate the institutions, given that deposits and 
loans earned government guarantees. This was the situation in the United 
States, Europe and Japan, where the banking hecatomb was serious. 
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 In Latin America and the Caribbean, only the affi liates of the global 
fi nancial conglomerates were directly affected by the crisis, and in their case, the 
solution adopted depended on the position of the governments in the countries 
where their global headquarters are based. The domestic private banks in Latin 
America, in general, were not involved in the second-hand mortgage securities, 
and were able to continue operating. They only do not do so because they were 
engulfed by the panic that their loans would not be repaid. Despite efforts by 
Latin American and Caribbean governments to convince the bankers that they 
would not permit the crisis to last, it is clear that the “national” banks have not 
restored the supply of credit to the real economy of their countries. In Brazil, 
the government created new lines of credit at the public banks and tried to 
force them to reduce the interest rates that they charged. But, even here, the 
government decisions met resistance, which in Brazil recently provoked the 
substitution by the government of the president of the country’s largest public 
bank, the Banco do Brasil.
 In addition to the fi nancial revival policies, the governments of various 
countries – including those in Latin American and the Caribbean – are 
introducing various policies designed to stimulate demand for consumer goods 
and services and among companies in the real economy for production services 
and goods. Considering that spending on vital consumption cannot fall, it 
would be impossible to compensate the drop in exports by means of redirecting 
production to the domestic market, except by reviving discretionary spending 
and investment in the real economy. 1 The discretionary spending of families 
can be stimulated through temporary reduction of taxes on durable goods and 
redistribution of income to the most poor by increasing subsidies such as the 
Family Grant program, pensions, the minimum wage, free openings in public 
schools and hospitals and similar measures. Private investment is stimulated 
by reducing long term interest and taxes on the sales of machinery, vehicles, 
computers and similar items. 
 One policy strongly recommended by John Maynard Keynes to increase 
internal demand is to raise public spending, both current as well as investment. 
The expansion of public services, which in general do not meet demand, in 
addition to being an end in itself, expands public employment and therefore the 
demand for goods and services from those who were previously unemployed. 
The construction of roads, ports and airports, energy generation, storage and 
distribution systems, etc, generate jobs fi rst in construction and later in the 
operation of the services that will be offered after the construction. 
 Equally important policies to combat the crisis are social programs to 
reduce poverty and social exclusion. This category includes building low income 
housing, schools, street paving, the reurbanization of urban slums and similar 
measures. Nearly all of the Latin American and Caribbean governments are 
conducting steps of this nature, evidently within the limits of their budgets and 
the ability to expand the public debt. 
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Dilemmas Concerning the Prevention of Future Crises
 The formulation, discussion and approval of the measures to fi ght the 
global crisis, in various countries, will necessarily take some time. Even after 
their approval by legislatures, some of these policies, such as those that involve 
construction or civil service exams to expand the ranks of public employees, 
demand considerable time before they produce the desired effects. This is what 
makes it diffi cult to predict when the results of the fi ght against the global crisis 
will begin to appear, inaugurating the recovery of economic activity. 
 Since the countries hit by the crisis are connected through globalization, 
above all by the presence in nearly all the countries of large enterprises affi liated 
to the giant transnational networks, the fi ght against the crisis cannot be 
conducted in isolation by each Nation State. If the transnational companies do 
not cooperate with the national governments, above all in the poorest countries, 
the fi ght against the crisis by government can fail. Coordination of national 
policies is probably the only way to induce the global leaders of transnationals to 
overcome their pessimism and strive to increase production and employment in 
the countries where they act. 
 In reality, the fi ght against the crisis does not depend on all of the two 
hundred some odd countries in the world coordinating their policies. It is 
suffi cient for the governments of the largest economies to do so. This is why the 
G-7, the group of governments of the world’s seven largest economies has had 
such a strategic role since the current crisis erupted. But the much greater growth 
of the emerging economies in recent decades has changed the global economic 
and political balance, requiring opening the circle of economies considered 
“dominant,” the coordination among which is indispensable to control the 
global crisis.  
 To illustrate this important process of re-establishing equilibrium in the 
global economy, we can look at the growth of GNP in the world as a whole and 
in the fi rst and third worlds from 2003- 2008. In this period, the global economy 
grew 22.32%, with annual average growth of 3.4%;  fi rst world economies in the 
same period grew 9.19%, at an average annual rate of 1.48%; and third world 
economies grew 45.89% in the same period, or at an average annual rate of 6.5%. 
The difference in the growth rate between the fi rst and third worlds is expressive: 
the latter grew nearly fi ve times more than the former. That is in these six years, 
third world economies grew nearly 50% while the fi rst world grew about 10% 
(Cepal, 2008).
 This broad difference in economic growth rates between developed 
and developing nations has made inevitable the substitution of the G-7 for the 
G-20 in the coordination of national economic policies. The G-20 includes all 
the G-7 nations, as well as all the other countries that compose the European 
Union (which are treated as a block and have one vote) and a variety of other 
nations, many from the Third World. It is probable that the severe shock of the 
global crisis on the hegemony of the G-7 and on neoliberal thinking has also 
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contributed to this unedited expansion of the center of coordination of the 
global economy. 
 The fi nancial system faces the fi rst dilemma raised in the historic 
conjunction of this effort to reverse the crisis. There is apparent unanimity in the 
G-20 that it should be changed, through the institution of an international agency 
for the regulation of global fi nances. The objectives of the regulation appear clear: 
to avoid a repeat of the crisis, by establishing stricter limits on fi nancial speculation 
and eliminating the existing ease of transgressing the few limits to the freedom 
of action of fi nancial transnationals, including that of avoiding national taxes, by 
hiding large sums of money in secret accounts in “tax havens. ”  
 The very idea of an international regulatory agency is only justifi ed if 
fi nancial globalization continues to be based on the unrestricted liberty of the 
movement of fi nancial instruments across the borders of nearly all nations. The 
only exceptions are found in a number of Asian countries such as China, India and 
Malaysia and in Latin America in Argentina, Venezuela and Cuba (this is not a 
complete list). Governments in these countries establish controls by imposing limits 
and or taxes on remittances of funds both in and out of the country. The massive 
entrance of dollars and other strong currencies attracted by high interest and tax 
advantages, and by the ability to leave as soon as the perspectives for speculative 
gains decrease, lead to increased value for national currencies, reduced savings and 
increased consumption  on high value and often imported  goods – by those who 
come to save less. There is, in these cases, a substitution of national savings for 
foreign savings, a high foreign debt and therefore, risk of a currency crisis.
 At times of economic crisis, the panic leads the propertied classes to 
hoard their net wealth instead of investing it directly or making it 
available to those who want to, through the fi nancial system. Another harmful 
manifestation of the panic is “capital fl ight,” which occurs when affi liates of 
multinationals transfer large sums to their headquarters, located outside of the 
country of operation, so that they can cover losses and meet obligations. This in 
fact occurred in many Latin American countries immediately after the eclosion of 
the fi nancial crisis in 2008. The capital fl ight reduced the supply of funds, leading 
to a devaluation of the national currency in relation to the currency that was 
being removed from the country and consequently to strong infl ationary pressure 
due to the rise in prices of all imported products. 
 The international fi nancial crisis raises a fundamental question: why not 
do away with fi nancial globalization as a whole, restoring in all countries the 
power of the people to decide, by electing the government and the parliament, 
in what way their savings, or that is their social surplus, should be administered? 
The manner that the public or private owners administer their savings has strong 
effects on the economy and on the social and political life of each country, as we 
have just seen. 
 The liberty of each one to manipulate their property should be 
subordinated to the guidelines of economic authorities to maintain economic 
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stability and progress. The large majority of savers are composed of simple 
people who by saving, sacrifi ce satisfactions they put off to be able to attend 
to emergencies not covered by social security -  and even those covered in the 
cases of the many who do not have these benefi ts. These savers are usually 
not concerned with the interest they may earn and even less on speculative 
investments. It is those savers with income so high that it far exceeds their total 
spending on daily needs who tend to see their non-spent income as capital, 
and therefore as a source of more income through its investment in securities, 
the values of which are redefi ned daily in stock, commodity and futures 
exchanges. This also applies to the savings of large companies and naturally to 
the fi nancial fi rms who live directly on their own fi nancial speculation  and as 
consultants to others.2
 The savings of the middle and upper class, when there is no crisis, is 
trusted to banks or funds, public or private. These are capitalist companies that 
seek to maximize profi ts, and to do so, must invest money deposited in them by 
clients in securities issued by different fi rms. These are contracts through which 
their holders receive interest or dividends during the time in which the money 
remains with those that issue the securities. The banks and funds that invest the 
deposits receive an administrative fee that is proportional to the earning obtained 
by the depositors. But since the future of the enterprises is unknown, a part of 
them suffer losses, which can impede them from complying with the contracts 
they have with the institutions that invest in them. The losses produced are 
suffered by depositors in banks or funds that apply the money of the depositors in 
fi rms that went bad. When the losses are many and large, the banks and funds are 
required to compensate the depositors with their own capital, which in general is 
not enough to cover all the losses. When this takes place on a large scale, many 
banks and funds fail and the crisis is the consequence. 
 Small savers often place the little that they have after paying their bills 
in entities that they create and generate. These may be collective enterprises, 
which seek to preserve the purchasing power of the deposits entrusted in them 
and invest the funds deposited in loans to the partners (rotating funds) or in 
other collective enterprises. Examples of these operations are credit cooperatives, 
rotating “solidarity funds” and community banks. 
Since each family has savings of small value, the interest that they may earn 
is miniscule and does not compensate the risk of losing the saving that they will 
need in case of illness, unemployment or death. For this reason, the propensity 
to speculate of working people and of the entities that administer their savings is 
insignifi cant.
Conclusions
 The international fi nancial and economic crisis is the result of instability 
that characterizes any economy guided by market mechanisms. This instability 
is characteristic of any free market. That is, in which there is no institution that 
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conciliates the interest of sellers and buyers. The free market is a space in which 
a variable number of agents exchange money for fi nancial goods or assets. Both 
the quantity of exchanges as well as their value depend on the will of the agents, 
which is not predetermined, and therefore, depends on the interaction between 
those who buy and those who sell. The indetermination is even greater because 
of the presence of agents who can be both buyers and sellers of the same goods: 
they are the speculators, who look for profi ts selling products after they increase 
in value and buying products after a decrease in value, during the transactions in 
a market or in a larger group of globalized markets. 
 Oscillations in prices and quantities of goods are inevitable if the complete 
liberty of the market agents is respected. Since the oscillations are harmful to the 
agents, since its birth in the 19th century, economic policy has sought to fi nd a 
market structure that eliminates the oscillations or causes them to be predictable. 
The conclusion that can be gathered from these centuries of discussion is that any 
market structure  that does not allow prices and quantities to vary, or that makes 
the variations obey rules that make them predictable, inevitably must impose 
heavy restrictions on the liberty of the agents to conduct transactions. 
 It was during the last century that attempts at market stabilization 
moved from the theoretical plane to the practical plane, in the countries that 
adopted centrally planned economies. There is no space here to discuss these 
experiments, but the conclusion is unavoidable that the disadvantages caused 
by these restrictions to the liberty of the agents were much greater than the 
advantages created by the elimination of the oscillations of quantities and prices 
in the markets. 
 This is not to say that markets should not or cannot be regulated by some 
level of government authority. It is the responsibility of governments to prevent 
the sale of products harmful to consumers’ health, and to oversee the fulfi llment 
of contracts for future delivery of goods sold or of future payment of goods sold 
and already delivered. This type of regulation serves to prevent that the will and 
expectations of agents be violated, but does not prevent markets to continue to be 
instable as they always have been. 
 If, therefore, the current desideratum is to prevent new fi nancial crises, 
it is necessary that the markets in which money is exchanged for fi nancial assets 
not be free, in the sense that they not be governed solely by the private interests 
of individual people or companies. This is perfectly possible without harming 
economic liberties in other markets. But, to do so, it must be recognized that 
the fi nancial service of guarding the net wealth (that is, money) of the public and 
of loaning it to private and public companies and individuals is,  in and of itself, 
a public service and, therefore, this service must be reserved to governments or 
associated not for profi t entities.
 Financial intermediation must, therefore, be exercised exclusively by 
government, because only in this way can banks, funds and similar agents stop 
looking to maximize their own surplus and dedicate themselves to the public 
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good, defi ned democratically in periodic electoral disputes. Since there is still 
no democratically elected public government at the global level, it is logical to 
conclude that a public fi nancial authority can only be national, given that it is 
only in the realm of the Nation-State that the practice of democracy takes place. 
 Since 1945, the world has enjoyed the services of a set of entities that 
constitute the so-called U.N. family, integrated by a large number of nations, 
most of them democratic. Despite this, it cannot be said that global instances of 
power formed by representatives of governments can be democratic, although 
the large majority of the member governments are. They are not because global 
democracy would require that the election of the people who exercise power by 
means of entities in the U.N. family or similar entities be conducted by global 
citizens, in direct elections in which candidates can be people from any country 
that is a member of the entities in question. 
 It is clear that the large majority of governments today are not willing to 
transfer part of their constitutional power to extra-national entities. This is found 
both in the United Nations as well as in the European Union, and as long as this 
is the case, there is no other option than to propose the nationalization of the 
fi nancial systems, terminating for good the experience of weakening Nation States 
to the advantage of the empowering of the complexes of private capital, above all 
those that are transnational. 
 The large international crisis of 2008 was borne from the revocation of the 
Bretton Woods regulations and national laws that enforced them by submitting 
fi nancial markets to the control of national governments. The global regulation of 
the circulation of capital passed from public agencies to a set of immense fi nancial 
companies seeking profi t that dominated the globalized fi nancial markets for their 
own benefi t and not for the benefi t of any national government. The crisis has the 
enormous scope that it does because the Nation States did not have and do not 
now have the power to prevent it. In this respect, the Commission of Experts of 
the President of the General Assembly on reforms of the international monetary 
and fi nancial system, directed by the 2001 Nobel Prize winning economist, 
Joseph Stiglitz, and composed of renowned economists and public policy makers 
and executors from Japan, Western Europe, Africa, Latin America and South and 
East Asia, approved the following recommendation: 
Market-driven international capital fl ows are of such a magnitude and 
volatility that they can offset any formal mechanism to provide additional 
fi nance for development. Thus, an active management of foreign capital 
infl ows will be required to ensure that they are supportive of the counter-
cyclical policies of Governments. The Articles of Agreement of IMF provide 
members with the authority to control capital infl ows and expressly exclude 
the use of Fund resources to meet imbalances resulting from capital account 
disequilibrium. The Fund should be encouraged to return to its original 
principles and to support countries that attempt to manage external capital 
fl ows in support of domestic counter-cyclical policies.3
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Notes
1  Discretionary spending is that not motivated by immediate and unavoidable needs such 
as food, lodging (rent, maintenance), transportation, medicine and similar items, but for 
durable goods, homes, furniture, appliances, automobiles, clothing) and services whose 
purchase can be put off (having children, vacation travel, plastic surgery, sports and 
similar activities). 
2  These facts inspired the great Polish economist Michael Kaletski to formulate the 
following law: “Workers spend what they earn and capitalists earn what they earn.” This 
means that workers who earn only what is needed to live, or little more than this, must 
necessarily spend soon nearly everything they earn. Capitalists earn much more than they 
need, but if (as a class) they do not spend all that they earn, they will not fi nd anyone 
to purchase all that they have to sell, because the money withheld from commercial 
circulation by hoarding will cause a similar amount in goods produced for the market to 
not fi nd buyers. 
3.  Recommendations of the Commission of Experts of the President of the General 
Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, United 
Nations General Assembly, New York, April 29, 2009. 
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class in comparison with the proletariat around the globe as it permitted multinationals to 
relocate their companies to countries in which the cost of the labor force is lower. The crisis 
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no longer fi nd buyers abroad in return for redistribution of income and increase of public 
investment. In the last six years, emerging economies have grown 50% while industrialized 
countries have grown only 10%. This fact has increased the number of nations that must 
coordinate among each other to tackle the global crisis from seven (G7) to twenty (G20). 
One of the lessons to be learned from the crisis is that instead of fi nancial globalization, 
the people of each country must have the right to decide how their social surplus must 
be managed. Monitoring the use of public money as well as public loans to investors 
and consumers must be the responsibility solely  of public authorities and not-for-profi t 
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